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unauthorized use of Bank cards With or Without the pin: a lost case for the customer? 
The purpose of the article is to present the issues and 
dilemmas of digital data encryption in the criminal 
context in Slovenia. Encrypting digital data with easy to 
use software (e.g. TrueCrypt) has become a simple task 
for everyone with basic computer knowledge. Although 
such encryption programs are free to use, they still 
contain extremely high-grade encryption algorithms. 
Thus, encrypted digital data is virtually inaccessible to 
investigators – they are usually unable to obtain access 
to the digital data, even if they have a warrant allowing 
them to do so.
It is possible to read the plain text if the suspect or the 
accused can be forced to provide the password with which 
the data is protected, or to provide access to the plain 
text. However, traditional constitutional and criminal law 
doctrine prohibits this on account of the privilege against 
self-incrimination. Digital data encrypted with modern 
encryption methods will thus remain largely unattainable 
to criminal investigators, which will result in difficulties in 
prosecuting criminal offences, in circumstances where it is 
considered that important evidence is in digital form and 
protected with encryption.
This article considers some theoretical and practical 
findings in Slovenian criminal practice and explains the 
possible future development of this problem in Slovenia.
Introduction 
We live in a digital society where information is crucial. 
Along with digital data came the need and desire for 
the confidentiality of information, and encryption 
(cryptography) provides this requirement. From this 
perspective, data encryption is a necessary and a 
welcome phenomenon in a modern society. However, 
the dark side of data encryption is seen in criminal 
proceedings where it prevents law enforcement agents 
from obtaining access to the information contained in 
the digital data, even though they may be in possession 
of a judicial warrant that entitles them to obtain access 
to the data. This is especially problematic when dealing 
with terrorism, organized crime, espionage and abusive 
images of children, where the perpetrators encode crucial 
evidence with encryption software. This was evident in the 
Aum Supreme Truth case in 1995. The Cult dropped bags 
of sarin nerve gas in the Tokyo subway, killing 12 people 
and injuring 6,000.1 The cult stored their records on 
computers encrypted with the RSA encryption standard. 
Investigators were able to decrypt the files that were 
stored on a floppy disk. These files contained evidence 
(including plans and intentions to deploy weapons of 
mass destruction in Japan and the United States) that 
was crucial to the investigation and lead to a conviction 
of the cult members.2 It is safe to say that if the Aum 
Supreme cult used contemporary encryption programs, 
the outcome could be quite different.
The aim of this paper is to present some of the criminal 
law problems regarding digital data encryption in 
Slovenia, and suggestions for the future. Many modern 
digital age services (e.g. bank transactions, internet 
banking, credit card online shopping, personal online 
registries, etc.) could not be performed without digital 
cryptography. Digital encryption is a valuable asset in 
today’s digital information age.
On the other hand, digital data encryption can prove 
to be extremely problematic when investigating serious 
crimes where the offender encodes digital evidence 
with an encryption method. Data protected this way 
becomes useless and inaccessible to computer forensics 
and criminal investigators. This poses difficulties from 
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derives from the fact that it has a monopoly on the means 
of physical coercion that can be used to compel people 
to follow specific conduct.3 This goes hand in hand with 
the power of the state to control and monitor digital 
communications, and to obtain digital data of a criminal 
offence from a suspect. There are methods that can be 
used to find a password or to reveal the plain text, but 
it is right to indicate that in general, the investigating 
authorities are rarely able to decrypt encrypted data.4 
Recently, criminal legal theory has been presented 
with significant dilemmas about how to obtain digital 
data from information systems that are protected with 
encryption software. There are numerous programs on 
the market that can encrypt digital data with the AES 
encryption standard. These programs are easy to use and 
can be legally obtained from the Internet. However, the 
problems that these programs present to law enforcement 
agents are immense.
Investigators are presented with possible evidence 
hidden in a digital data carrier, but are not able to obtain 
access to it. They need the password to obtain access to 
the data. However, the suspect is not necessarily bound 
by the law to give the password,5 since he is protected 
by the privilege against self-incrimination (United States 
Constitution’s Fifth Amendment and Article 29 of the 
Slovenian Constitution).
It is to be questioned whether modern criminal law 
should allow this status quo to continue, and whether 
investigators are completely disabled when dealing 
with encrypted data, and if this is a completely new 
phenomenon unknown to traditional criminal law which 
requires a completely different approach. It is suggested 
that the truth lies in a new approach by the law to digital 
data encryption.
Criminal law review
Criminal investigators and law enforcement agents have 
been dealing with digital encryption since it became so 
advanced that protected files became unattainable to 
them. There have been numerous attempts to break or 
weaken digital cryptography – since physical and digital 
methods were unsuccessful, various solutions have been 
proposed: cryptanalysis; making the use of cryptography 
illegal; use of weak cryptography; key escrow; imposition 
of cryptography standards, licensed and legal limitations, 
and refusal to decrypt as a criminal offence.
Refusal to decrypt as a criminal offence
In circumstances where the investigating authorities have 
cause to obtain a warrant to search a computer, and the 
data is protected, invariably investigators cannot obtain 
access to the data. In these circumstances, investigators 
would like to require the suspect to provide the password 
or plain text, but the privilege against self incrimination 
effectively means that, in the absence of legislation that 
curtails the right in such circumstances, this human 
right overrules the concerns of the investigators. As the 
European Court of Human Rights wrote in Saunders v 
United Kingdom:
‘The right to silence and the right not to incriminate 
oneself are generally recognised international 
standards which lie at the heart of the notion of 
a fair procedure under Article 6. The right not to 
incriminate oneself, in particular, presupposes that 
the prosecution in a criminal case seek to prove their 
case against the accused without resort to evidence 
obtained through methods of coercion or oppression in 
defiance of the will of the accused.’6 
The privilege against self incrimination is a constituent 
element of the presumption of innocence that is the core 
of a fair criminal trial. This is indirectly seen in Article 6 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights,7 where point 
2 stipulates that everyone charged with a criminal offence 
shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according 
to law (with a limited definition of the privilege of self 
incrimination).
The privilege is encapsulated in the Fifth Amendment 
of the United States Constitution,8 and in Article 14(3)(g) 
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights9 
(1966):
‘In the determination of any criminal charge against 
him, everyone shall be entitled to the following 
minimum guarantees, in full equality:
(g) Not to be compelled to testify against himself or to 
confess guilt.’
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The Slovenian Constitution10 also adopts the broader 
definition in article 29, and stipulates that anyone in 
a criminal procedure has a right not to incriminate 
themselves or their loved ones, or to confess guilt:
Člen 29 slovenske Ustave (pravna jamstva v 
kazenskem postopku)
Vsakomur, ki je obdolžen kaznivega dejanja, morajo 
biti ob popolni enakopravnosti zagotovljene tudi 
naslednje pravice:
– da ima primeren čas in možnosti za pripravo svoje 
obrambe;
– da se mu sodi v njegovi navzočnosti in da se brani 
sam ali z zagovornikom;
– da mu je zagotovljeno izvajanje dokazov v njegovo 
korist;
– da ni dolžan izpovedati zoper sebe ali svoje bližnje, 
ali priznati krivdo.
Article 29 of Slovenian Constitution (legal guarantees 
in a criminal procedure)
Anyone charged with a criminal offence shall be in full 
equality guaranteed the following rights:
- To have adequate time and facilities to prepare his 
defence;
- To be tried in his presence, and to defend himself in 
person or through legal assistance;
- The right to present evidence in his favour;
- The right not to incriminate himself or his family, or to 
confess guilt.
The issue is whether the state, by forcing a suspect to 
cooperate with law enforcement agents by giving up 
the encryption password, violates the privilege against 
self incrimination. The response is complex, but digital 
encryption is a new phenomenon, and laws written 
centuries ago (the Fifth Amendment was adopted in 1791 
and it can be traced back to Magna Carta in 1215) have to 
be adopted to accommodate the age of technology. Due 
to limitations on space, we will not provide a complex 
analysis of the privilege against self incrimination, and the 
reader’s attention is drawn to the position in the United 
States of America and England & Wales in the context of 
encrypted data.11 
Slovenian law review
Paragraph 6 of article 219.a of the Slovenian Criminal 
Procedural Act (ZKP)12 stipulates that the owner or user 
of an electronic device must allow access to the device, 
provide encryption keys or encryption passwords, and 
explanations on the use of devices that are necessary 
to achieve the purpose of an investigation.13 Failure to 
comply may lead to punishment and imprisonment of up 
to one month or until the order is complied with. Article 
220 paragraph (2) of Slovenian Criminal Procedural Act 
provides as follows:
Kdor ima take predmete, jih mora na zahtevo sodišča 
izročiti. Če noče izročiti predmetov, se sme kaznovati z 
denarno kaznijo določeno v prvem odstavku 78. člena 
tega zakona, če tega še vedno noče storiti, pa se sme 
zapreti. Zapor traja do izročitve predmetov ali do konca 
kazenskega postopka, vendar največ mesec dni.
Any person possessing items that may be seized 
under criminal law, must deliver them at the request 
of the court. If the person does not comply, he may 
be punished by a fine set out in paragraph 78 of this 
Act, and if he still refuses to do so, may be imprisoned. 
Imprisonment can last up to delivery of the items or the 
end of the criminal proceedings, but no more than one 
month.
10 Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia, 
Slovenian Gazette RS No. 33/1991 from 
28 December 1991, with amendments No. 
42/1997, 66/2000, 24/2003, 69/2004, 
69/2004, 69/2004, 68/2006.
11 For further reading on the topic see Stephen 
Mason, gen ed, Electronic Evidence Chapter 
6 ‘Encrypted Data’; Hanni Fakhoury, ‘A 
Combination or a Key? The Fifth Amendment 
and Privilege against Compelled 
Decryption’, Digital Evidence and Electronic 
Signature Law Review 9 (2012), 81 – 87; 
Earl Warren, ‘An Analysis of In re Grand Jury 
Subpoena Duces Tacum (United States v. 
Doe): Does the Fifth Amendment Protect 
the Contents of Private Papers?’ Pace Law 
Review 15/1 (1994), 303 – 337.
12 Slovenian Criminal Procedural Act (ZKP-
UPB4), Slovenian Gazette n. 32/2007, 
amended with ZKP-I n. 68/2008, ZKP-J n. 
77/2009, ZKP-K n. 91/2011, and ZKP-L n. 
47/2013.
13 Paragraph 6 of Article 219.a of Slovenian 
Criminal Procedural Act:
 Imetnik oziroma uporabnik elektronske 
naprave mora omogočiti dostop do naprave, 
predložiti šifrirne ključe oziroma šifrirna 
gesla in pojasnila o uporabi naprave, ki so 
potrebna, da se doseže namen preiskave. 
Če noče tako ravnati, se sme kaznovati 
oziroma zapreti po določbi drugega 
odstavka 220. člena tega zakona, razen če 
gre za osumljenca ali obdolženca ali osebo, 
ki ne sme biti zaslišana kot priča (235. člen) 
ali se je v skladu s tem zakonom odrekla 
pričevanju (236. člen).
 The owner or user of the electronic device 
must allow access to the device, provide 
encryption keys or encryption passwords, 
and explanations on the use of the device 
that are necessary to achieve the purpose 
of the investigation. If unwilling to do so, he 
may be punished or imprisoned by article 
220 of this Act, unless he is a suspect, 
the accused, or the person who may not 
be heard as a witness (article 235), or in 
accordance with this Act has a right to 
decline to be heard (article 236).
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However, this provision cannot be used against the 
suspect; the accused (the defendant); a person that 
cannot be heard as a witness;14 or when a person has 
a right to decline to be heard (privileged witness). The 
latter category, under the provisions of article 236 of 
the Slovenian Criminal Procedural Act, includes the 
defendant’s spouse, defendant’s blood relatives in the 
direct line, collateral relatives up to and including the 
third degree and relatives by affinity up to and including 
the second degree, the defendant’s adopted child and 
the adoptive parent, religious confessor, lawyer, doctor, 
social worker, psychologist or any other person who has 
a duty to maintain secrecy regarding his profession. It is 
evident that the list consists of numerous persons that 
could potentially know the encryption key and cannot be 
forced to give it up. In this regard, Slovenian legislation 
is the complete opposite of the UK legislation. One 
option for Slovenia (for more effective criminally-oriented 
legislation) would be to limit the privileged witness list in 
article 220 ZKP.
Paragraph 6 of article 219.a of the Slovenian Criminal 
Procedural Act provides a presumption that a request for 
surrender of encryption keys and passwords from the 
defendant or the accused violates his constitutionally 
guaranteed privilege against self incrimination.15 
Additionally, if encryption keys are gained by fraud 
or deception from the privileged persons, or if the 
provisions of the Procedural Code are not respected, 
then any evidence gained this way must be excluded 
from the criminal procedure in accordance with the rule 
of exclusion found in article 18 of Slovenian Criminal 
Procedural Act.
Where a person does not comply with an order of the 
court, this in itself does not present a special criminal 
offence, but only a penalty issued by the court. Not 
complying with the order is only a minor misdemeanour 
with no serious consequences (maximum one month of 
imprisonment) – in the United Kingdom this would be 
a special criminal offence with a serious imprisonment 
penalty (up to two or even five years, s 53(5) of RIPA).
When comparing the legislation of the UK and Slovenia, 
it is evident that each presents one side of the coin. 
In Slovenia, the privilege against self-incrimination is 
safeguarded to almost irrational boundaries, while in the 
UK, it has been decided that the balance between the 
privilege in respect of encrypted data and the harm that 
could be caused (e.g. terrorists planning to kill people; 
people filming the rape of a girl of 5 years old to distribute 
to others for pleasure) means that the state has decided 
that the risks of not having access to encrypted data 
outweigh the rights of the accused.
Although jurists from United Kingdom may hail their 
legislation for its effectiveness in the limited way it affects 
the right against self incrimination, and Slovenian jurists 
may advocate their high constitutional standards, it is 
considered that legislation that goes to such extreme 
boundaries is not recommended. The answer lies in 
proportionality between the constitutional rights of each 
person, the rule of law, and effectiveness of criminal 
prosecution (punishing guilty offenders is also an element 
of the rule of law – there is no rule of law where nobody 
can be prosecuted and sentenced for a criminal offence).
We must be careful that in safeguarding constitutional 
rights, the effective criminal prosecution of complex crime 
does not become almost impossible.16 
A best solution?
Although this part is given the heading ‘the best 
solution’, there is no best solution when dealing with 
digital cryptography. There are only potential solutions. 
However, none of them deals with the core of the 
problem.
One option is to do nothing. This is also called the zero 
option by professor Koops. He argues that:
‘The zero option does not infringe privacy and the 
right to confidential communications, the right to 
a fair trial, the rule of law in general, or the right to 
economic development. Needless to say, the zero 
option is also workable, internationally compatible, 
14 After article 235 ZKP:
 Kot priča ne sme biti zaslišan:
 1) kdor bi s svojo izpovedbo prekršil 
dolžnost varovanja uradne ali vojaške 
tajnosti, dokler ga pristojni organ ne odveže 
te dolžnosti;
 2) obdolženčev zagovornik o tem, kar 
mu je obdolženec zaupal kot svojemu 
zagovorniku, razen če obdolženec to sam 
zahteva.
 Who cannot be heard as a witness:
 1) A person who by his testimony would 
violate his duty to guard official or military 
secrets, unless that person is relieved of such 
duty by the competent authority.
 2) The defendant’s attorney about 
everything that the defendant has entrusted 
to him, unless at the request of the 
defendant.
15 Liljana Selinšek, Computer crime and solving 
the problems in practice (Računalniška 
kriminaliteta in reševanje problemov iz 
prakse), (Pravosodni bilten, 32/2 2011), 228.
16 Evidence that is obtained illegally is not 
permitted in Slovenia. However, after 
article 18 of the Criminal Procedural Act 
no exceptions to this doctrine are allowed 
(independent source, good faith exception 
...). These exceptions to the doctrine were 
adopted as a safety measure so that the rule 
of law could be respected and enforced. The 
Slovenian legislator demands the radical 
exclusion – there is no pondering between 
the magnitude of the violation on one side, 
and the fairness of the procedure and the 
intensity of the offence on the other. See also 
Katja Šugman and Primož Gorkič, Evidence 
in Criminal Proceedings (Dokazovanje 
v kazenskem postopku), (Ljubljana: GV 
Založba, 2011), 279 - 281.
digital data encryption – aspects of criminal laW and dilemmas in slovenia
Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, 10 (2013)        151© Pario Communications Limited, 2013
and technologically sustainable.’17
However, there is one crucial flaw to the zero option – 
it does not solve the problem of digital encryption in 
criminal cases. It is therefore not a solution to the problem 
at all, only a postponement of a criminal law dilemma. In 
a digital age where computer crime and cyber terrorism 
is constantly evolving, such an approach would be 
dangerous and irresponsible.
The next option is that there is a greater emphasis 
on technology, and hope that in the future computer 
forensics will be able to solve any kind of encryption. 
Fakhoury is very optimistic in this regard. Arguing that:
‘With advances in technology, the government may 
inevitably be able to crack decryption quicker and 
cheaper than before ... this technology can potentially 
create a situation that is good for everyone: the 
government gets all the evidence it is entitled to, and 
the user does not have to testify against himself.’18 
The reality is different. The advances in technology have 
not brought the easy decryption as Fakhoury hopes, but 
unbreakable encryption. When digital encryption was in 
its primal stage, it was still possible to crack it. The first 
versions of PGP provided strong encryption, but there was 
still hope of cracking it. Numerous criminal cases in recent 
times have illustrated that forensic experts cannot break 
modern encryption algorithms that are based on the AES 
encryption standard and protected with an appropriately 
strong password. When the author interviewed two 
Slovenian IT specialists, Kovačič19 and Kragelj,20 they 
both stated that breaking strong encryption is next to 
impossible.21 It is therefore naïve to expect that it will be 
possible to break encrypted data with new technology 
– quite the contrary, new technology will only bring new 
and even stronger encryption methods and algorithms. 
If it is possible to break certain encryption standards 
(such as AES), then a new standard will arise that will be 
unbreakable again. The solution to digital encryption is 
therefore probably not in digital technology.
Some advocate that when dealing with digital 
encryption, the burden of proof should be reversed – the 
suspect’s silence could be used as evidence against him. 
There are some arguments for this approach in Murray v 
United Kingdom.22 The European Court of Human Rights 
held that silence, when an explanation from the defendant 
should be presented (e.g. he was the only one in the 
room with the murdered victim), could be considered as 
incriminating for the defendant. However,
‘… the prosecutor must first establish a prima facie 
case against the accused, i.e. a case consisting of 
direct evidence which, if believed and combined 
with legitimate inferences based upon it, could 
lead a properly directed jury to be satisfied beyond 
reasonable doubt that each of the essential elements 
of the offence is proved.’23 
The question is whether the evidence adduced by the 
prosecution is sufficiently strong to require an answer.
‘The national court cannot conclude that the accused 
is guilty merely because he chooses to remain silent. 
It is only if the evidence against the accused “calls” 
for an explanation which the accused ought to be in a 
position to give that a failure to give any explanation 
“may as a matter of common sense allow the drawing 
of an inference that there is no explanation and that 
the accused is guilty.’24 
If these standards are respected, then the court would 
not consider that the criminal proceedings were unfair or 
that there had been an infringement of the presumption of 
innocence.25 
Koops writes that refusal to decrypt or deliver up 
the key might be used as supporting evidence that the 
suspect committed the crime but only if:
a) there is enough other evidence against the defendant 
that, combined with his refusal, allows a common-
sense conclusion of guilt;
b) the defendant was not pressured by the police to give 
the key;
c) the cipher text in issue must call for an explanation, 
and,
d) there is enough evidence that the defendant is able to 
decrypt.26 
Reversing the burden of proof must be used restrictively, 
since this method could contradict with the privilege 
17 Bert-Jaap Koops, The Crypto Controversy, 
A Key Conflict in the Information Society, 
(Eindhoven: University of Technology, 1999), 
235.
18 Hanni Fakhoury, ‘A Combination or a Key? 
The Fifth Amendment and Privilege against 
Compelled Decryption’, 87.
19 Mitja Kovačič, Interview with an IT specialist, 
Commission for Prevention of Corruption, 
(Ljubljana: May 23, 2012).
20 Primož Kragelj, Interview with an IT forensic 
specialist, (Ljubljana, May 24, 2012).
21 See also Mitja Kovačič, Privacy in 
Information Society (Zasebnost v 
informacijski družbi), (Teorija in praksa 37/6 
2000), 1027 - 1030.
22 Murray v United Kingdom, European Court of 
Human Rights decision, app. no. 18731/91, 8 
February 1996.
23 Murray v United Kingdom, paragraph 51.
24 Murray v United Kingdom, paragraph 51.
25 Murray v United Kingdom, paragraph 57.
26 Koops, 1999, 192.
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against self incrimination. However, in Slovenia this 
method is not likely to succeed for the prosecution, as the 
Constitutional Court (and criminal theory27) has always 
taken a negative position regarding reversing the burden 
of proof in a criminal trial:
‘The presumption of innocence means three things: 
first, that the burden of proof is on the plaintiff (the 
state) and not the defendant, secondly, that the state 
as the plaintiff bears the burden of persuasion, and 
thirdly that the court must acquit when in doubt (the 
principle in dubio pro reo).’28 
This strong constitutional position against shifting 
the burden of proof was established in Slovenian 
constitutional practice with decision U-I-18/93 in 1996, 
when the court overruled legislative provisions set out in 
the Criminal Procedural Act that tried to shift the burden 
of proof on to the defendant:
‘In reality, the burden of proof is on the defence,  
which contradicts Article 27 of the Constitution 
(Presumption of innocence). As it was previously 
stated, the Article quite unequivocally demands that 
the burden of proof in criminal cases is always on the 
side of the prosecution.’29 
Although reversing the burden of proof on a suspect in a 
criminal trial when dealing with a complicated encryption 
problem could gain approval of the European Court 
of Human Rights, it will not be allowed by Slovenian 
constitutional court.30 This does not mean that a 
Slovenian judge cannot consider the defendant’s silence – 
he can use his observations and common sense to gain an 
inner conviction about the defendant’s guilt.31 
One of the solutions to the problem is to use classic 
investigative measures and non-digital evidence. 
This was discussed by the author when dealing with 
another problematic aspect of digital evidencing – the 
Trojan horse defence.32 When gathering and presenting 
digital evidence, law enforcement agents should use 
traditional tactics and evidence – physical evidence, 
witnesses, motive, computer knowledge of the accused, 
interrogation. An overwhelming amount of non-digital 
evidence could lead to a common-sense conclusion of 
guilt if the defendant remains silent or does not provide 
the encrypted contents to the court. In some cases, 
concentrating the effort on non-digital evidence could be 
a minor solution to the cryptography problem.
Practice in Slovenia
There is no final judgement on this subject in the 
Slovenian legal practice. For this reason, the author 
consulted with Iztok Krumpak, one of the leading district 
state prosecutors in the field of digital encryption.33 
In 90 per cent of all pre-criminal procedures regarding 
encrypted data, the owners or the users of the encrypted 
digital device are persons who are also the suspects of 
a criminal offence. According to the provisions of the 
Criminal Procedural Act, the investigators are therefore 
unable to demand the encryption keys from them.34 
Krumpak explained that he has been dealing with a 
criminal case for over two years now, where the main 
evidence that the prosecution needs is encrypted on the 
suspect’s computer – the suspect was using TrueCrypt in 
a combination with virtual operation system and SimpLite 
for encryption of messages over MSN chat. Krumpak 
is doubtful if there is enough evidence for conviction. 
However, he is certain that the criminal offence could be 
proven with the evidence from the suspect’s computer, 
but the data is not available, because attempts as 
obtaining access to the data have been unsuccessful for 
two years.35 
There are two more reasons why there is almost no 
legal practice on digital encryption in Slovenia. First, 
not all suspects use encryption programs – if that is 
the case, Slovenian law enforcement agents are fairly 
successful in proving the criminal offence. Second, if 
the suspect is using unbreakable digital encryption, the 
prosecutors often have no other evidence on which to 
27 See Katja Šugman, Primož Gorkič, Evidence 
in Criminal Proceedings (Dokazovanje 
v kazenskem postopku) (Ljubljana: GV 
Založba, 2011), 60.
28 Slovenian Constitutional Court, Up-743/03 
9.3.2004, paragraph 5.
29 Slovenian Constitutional Court, U-I-18/93 
11.4.1996, paragraph 79.
30 This assumption is based on previous court 
rulings on the subject of shifting the burden 
of proof in a criminal trial, because there 
has not been a case connected directly with 
encrypted passwords and digital data to 
date.
31 The basic principle of Slovenian criminal 
procedure is ‘free assessment of evidence’ 
– the judge can therefore freely assess every 
item of evidence, including the suspect’s 
silence to a question he should provide 
explanation to. This cannot be the leading or 
only evidence the judge bases his conclusion 
of guilt upon.
32 Miha Šepec, ‘The Trojan horse defence – a 
modern problem of digital evidence’, Digital 
Evidence and Electronic Signature Law 
Review, 9 (2012), 58 – 66.
33 The author has also contacted numerous 
State District Attorney offices in Slovenia 
(DA Office in Celje, Maribor, Ljubljana, Novo 
Mesto, and Koper). However, they were 
not able to give any relevant information 
on the topic, except that when dealing with 
encrypted mobile telephones, the suspect 
usually unlocks the telephone for the 
investigators.
34 Iztok Krumpak, State Prosecutor’s aspect 
on the problem of digital evidence (Državno 
tožilski vidik problematike digitalnih 
dokazov), Digital Evidence (Maribor: Law 
Faculty, University of Maribor, 2012), 53.
35 Interview with Iztok Krumpak, one of the 
leading district state prosecutors on the 
field of digital encryption, District State’s 
Prosecution Office in Maribor, 6 May 2013.
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base their criminal procedure – they are therefore unable 
to prosecute – resulting in no case practice.
Krumpak therefore suggests the use of paragraph 
5 of article 219.a of the Criminal Procedural Act, which 
stipulates that if there is an imminent and serious danger 
to the safety of persons or property, the investigating 
judge can (at the oral request of the state prosecutor) 
order an immediate investigation of electronic devices 
with an oral order. In this way, law enforcement agents 
can break into the apartment and physically remove the 
suspect from the computer and gain access to the system 
while it is still active and not encrypted.36 
This method will not always be successful in practice. 
First, it will be extremely difficult to prove to the 
investigating judge that there is an imminent and serious 
danger to the safety of persons or property that will 
excuse the use of ordering an investigation through an 
oral order (if the order is written, the investigation is 
normally performed in a standardized manner where the 
police first knock on the door of the suspect and hand 
over the court order – which is enough time to shut off the 
computer and put in into a protected encrypted state). 
Second, there may be no guarantee that the suspects 
will be using their computer at the time the investigating 
authorities arrive.
The Slovenian Constitutional court has never discussed 
the question of encrypted digital data, however from its 
other rulings, the position is fairly evident. In case Up-
1678/08 (2009) the court was asked to the take a position 
regarding the right to remain silent (paragraph 4 of article 
29 of Slovenian Constitution). The court noted that article 
29 concerns the right to remain silent, and it extends to all 
statements. As such, it prevents all forms of coercion that 
would affect the defendant while giving a statement. This 
includes statements of testimonial and communicative 
nature, but not physical evidence resulting from the body 
of the defendant or which can be obtained independently 
from the defendant’s will, even if the defendant becomes 
an object of criminal proceedings in the process.
The court further explained that whether the evidence is 
testimonial or not is often questionable. In its decision, 
the court allowed the use of audio recording, in which the 
suspect’s voice was recorded – voice recording cannot be 
equivalent to a conscious profession of a defendant’s will. 
However, from the argument of the court, there can be no 
doubt that any form of coercion or forcing the defendant 
to give up a statement (e.g. encryption keys and 
passwords) would be considered unconstitutional and a 
direct violation of the privilege against self-incrimination 
under the article 29 of Slovenian Constitution.37 In 
decision Up-3367/07, the Slovenian Constitutional court 
took the position that the state cannot force the suspect 
or the defendant to give up any kind of oral statement or 
testimony (e.g. polygraph testimony) regarding a criminal 
offence he is accused of.38 
Conclusion
Encryption standards are constantly evolving and 
becoming more and more secure. This is good for the 
protection of digital data. However, it presents a serious 
threat to responding to criminal offences where important 
digital evidence is protected through encryption. 
Data protected this way becomes unattainable to law 
enforcement agents. When the state is not able to monitor 
digital communication and obtain digital data from a 
suspect of a criminal offence, the efficiency of the criminal 
prosecution becomes questionable.
There have been numerous attempts to break or 
weaken digital cryptography – since physical and digital 
methods were unsuccessful, the legislators turned to 
the law. Some of the solutions they have considered are: 
cryptanalysis; preventing the use of cryptography; the 
use of weak cryptography; key escrow; imposition of 
cryptography standards, licensed and legal limitations; 
refusal to decrypt as a criminal offence. None of these 
methods have proved to be perfect, because there is no 
best solution when dealing with digital encryption. It 
is necessary to constantly weigh each person’s privacy 
and his need to protect digital data on one side, and the 
effective prosecution of criminal offences on the other.
There is also the privilege against self-incrimination to 
consider. A suspect or defendant cannot be required to 
give up encryption passwords and keys, since he would 
incriminate himself. Arguably, he would in a way testify 
that he knew of the content that was encrypted on a 
certain digital media. The constitutional practice of the 
USA has found an exception to this rule in the form of the 
foregone conclusion doctrine when the government can 
prove that the suspect knows the decryption password 
and the content that is supposed to be encrypted. 
However, immunity must still be granted on the act of 
producing the unencrypted contents of the computer – the 
data obtained through this act can, on the other hand, be 
used as evidence in court.
36 Krumpak, p 51.
37 Slovenian Constitutional Court, Up-1678/08 
15.12.2009, paragraph 8.
38 Slovenian Constitutional Court, Up-3367/07 
2.7.2009, footnote 26.
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This exception was not adopted by Slovenian 
constitutional practice, which is extremely restricted 
when it comes to the privilege against self incrimination. 
From previous court judgements there can be no doubt 
that any form of coercion or forcing the defendant to 
give up the encryption keys and passwords would be 
considered unconstitutional and a direct violation of the 
privilege against self incrimination under article 29 of 
the Slovenian Constitution. The Slovenian Constitutional 
court has also taken the position that the state cannot 
force the suspect or the defendant to give any kind of 
oral statement regarding a criminal offence he is accused 
of. Slovenian prosecutors are therefore powerless when 
prosecuting a crime where the important evidence is 
hidden on a suspect’s encrypted computer system. They 
have practically no legal means by which to obtain the 
plain text – they are unable to prosecute, resulting in no 
criminal case practice on this subject in Slovenia.
Digital encryption remains one of more complex issues 
of modern criminal law. It presents a major problem to 
criminal prosecution and to the rule of law. This article 
presents some dilemmas and solutions, but is nowhere 
near a complete answer to the problem. We can hope that 
we will be able to achieve an ideal solution in the future – 
either by the law or by digital technology.
© Miha Šepec, 2013
digital data encryption – aspects of criminal laW and dilemmas in slovenia
Ljubljana Law University graduate, Criminal law assistant at 
European Law Faculty –University of Nova Gorica and Faculty 
of Criminal Justice and Security – University of Maribor, PhD 
candidate at Law Faculty of University of Maribor, Slovenia.
miha.sepec@fvv.uni-mb.si
miha.sepec@hotmail.com
